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Abstract. The Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer prefer-
ences over Students (SPA-S) involves assigning students to projects based
on student preferences over projects, lecturer preferences over students,
and the maximum number of students that each project and lecturer
can accommodate. This classical model assumes that preference lists are
strictly ordered. Here, we study a generalisation of SPA-S where ties are
allowed in the preference lists of students and lecturers, which we refer to
as the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over
Students with Ties (SPA-ST). We investigate stable matchings under the
most robust definition of stability in this context, namely super-stability.
We describe the first polynomial-time algorithm to find a super-stable
matching or to report that no such matching exists, given an instance
of SPA-ST. Our algorithm runs in O(L) time, where L is the total length
of all the preference lists. Finally, we present results obtained from an
empirical evaluation of the linear-time algorithm based on randomly-
generated SPA-ST instances. Our main finding is that, whilst super-stable
matchings can be elusive, the probability of such a matching existing is
significantly higher if ties are restricted to the lecturers’ preference lists.
1 Introduction
The Student-Project Allocation problem (SPA) [5,16] involves sets of students,
projects and lecturers, where students are to be assigned to projects offered by
lecturers. Applications of SPA can be found in many university departments, for
example, the School of Computing Science, University of Glasgow [15], the Fac-
ulty of Science, University of Southern Denmark [6], the Department of Com-
puting Science, University of York [14], and elsewhere [3,5,8]. In this setting,
lecturers provide a list of projects, and students are required to rank a subset of
these projects that they find acceptable, in order of preference. Typically there
may be upper bounds on the number of students that each project and lecturer
can accommodate. Considering the preferences and the capacities of projects and
lecturers, the problem then is to find a matching (i.e., an assignment of students
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2to projects such that each student is assigned at most one project, and the ca-
pacity constraints on projects and lecturers are not violated), which is optimal
in some sense according to the stated preferences.
In this work, we will concern ourselves with a variant of SPA that involves
lecturer preferences over students, which is known as the Student-Project Allo-
cation problem with lecturer preferences over Students (SPA-S). In this context,
it has been argued [22] that a natural property for a matching to satisfy is that
of stability. Informally, a stable matching ensures that no student and lecturer
who are not matched together would rather be assigned to each other than re-
main with their current assignees. Such a pair would have an incentive to form
a private arrangement outside of the matching, undermining its integrity. Other
variants of SPA in the literature involve lecturer preferences over their proposed
projects [13,18,19], lecturer preferences over (student, project) pairs [2], and no
lecturer preferences at all [15]. See [6] for a recent survey.
The classical SPA-S model assumes that preferences are strictly ordered. How-
ever, this might not be achievable in practice. For instance, a lecturer may be
unable or unwilling to provide a strict ordering of all the students who find her
projects acceptable. Such a lecturer may be happier to rank two or more stu-
dents equally in a tie, which indicates that the lecturer is indifferent between
the students concerned. This leads to a generalisation of SPA-S which we refer to
as the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecture preferences over Students
with Ties (SPA-ST). If we allow ties in the preference lists of students and lec-
turers, different stability definitions naturally arise. Suppose M is a matching in
an instance of SPA-ST. Informally, we say M is weakly stable, strongly stable or
super-stable if there is no student and lecturer such that if they decide to form
an arrangement outside the matching, respectively,
(i) both of them would be better off,
(ii) one of them would be better off and the other no worse off,
(iii) neither of them would be worse off.
With respect to this informal definition, clearly a super-stable matching is
strongly stable, and a strongly stable matching is weakly stable. These concepts
were first defined and studied by Irving [9] in the context of the Stable Marriage
problem with Ties, and subsequently extended to the Hospitals/Residents prob-
lem with Ties (HRT) [10,11] (where HRT is the special case of SPA-ST in which
each lecturer offers only one project, and the capacity of each project is the same
as the capacity of the lecturer offering the project).
Considering the weakest of the three stability concepts mentioned above, ev-
ery instance of SPA-ST admits a weakly stable matching (this follows by breaking
the ties in an arbitrary fashion and applying the stable matching algorithm de-
scribed in [1] to the resulting SPA-S instance). However, such matchings could be
of different sizes [17]. Thus opting for weak stability leads to the problem of find-
ing a weakly stable matching that matches as many students to projects as possi-
ble – a problem that is known to be NP-hard [12,17], even for the so-called Stable
Marriage problem with Ties and Incomplete lists, which is the special case of hrt
3in which each project (hospital) has capacity 1. Further, a 32 -approximation al-
gorithm was described in [7] for the problem of finding a maximum weakly stable
matching in an instance of SPA-ST.
Choosing super-stability avoids the problem of finding a weakly stable match-
ing with optimal cardinality, because (i) analogous to the HRT case, all super-
stable matchings have the same size [10], (ii) finding one or reporting that none
exists can be accomplished in linear-time (as we will see in this paper), and (iii)
if a super-stable matching M exists then all weakly stable matchings are of the
same size (equal to the size of M), and match exactly the same set of students
(see [20] for proof). Furthermore, Irving et al. argued in [10] that super-stability
is a very natural solution concept in cases where agents have incomplete infor-
mation. Central to their argument is the following proposition, stated for hrt
in [10, Proposition 2], which extends naturally to spa-st as follows (see [20] for
proof).
Proposition 1. Let I be an instance of SPA-ST, and let M be a matching in I.
Then M is super-stable in I if and only if M is stable in every instance of SPA-S
obtained from I by breaking the ties in some way.
In a practical setting, suppose that a student si has incomplete information
about two or more projects and decides to rank them equally in a tie T , and a
super-stable matching M exists in the corresponding SPA-ST instance I, where
si is assigned to a project in T . Then M is stable in every instance of spa-s
(obtained from I by breaking the ties) that represents the true preferences of
si. Consequently, we will focus on the concept of super-stability in the SPA-ST
context.
Unfortunately not every instance of SPA-ST admits a super-stable matching.
This is true, for example, in the case where there are two students, two projects
and one lecturer, where the capacity of each project is 1, capacity of the lecturer
is 2, and every preference list is a single tie of length 2. Nonetheless, it should be
clear from the discussion above that a super-stable matching should be preferred
in practical applications when one does exist.
Irving et al. [10] described an algorithm to find a super-stable matching given
an instance of HRT, or to report that no such matching exists. However, merely
reducing an instance of SPA-ST to an instance of HRT and applying the algorithm
described in [10] to the resulting HRT instance does not work in general (see [20]
for a further explanation).
Our Contribution. In this paper, we describe the first polynomial-time algo-
rithm to find a super-stable matching or to report that no such matching exists,
given an instance of SPA-ST – thus solving an open problem given in [1,16]. Our
algorithm runs in time linear in the size of the problem instance. The remaining
sections of this paper are structured as follows. We give a formal definition of the
SPA-S problem, the SPA-ST variant, and the super-stability concept in Sect. 2. We
describe our algorithm for SPA-ST under super-stability in Sect. 3. Further, Sect. 3
also presents our algorithm’s correctness results and some structural properties
satisfied by the set of super-stable matchings in an instance of SPA-ST. In Sect. 4,
4we present results arising from an empirical evaluation that investigates how
the nature of the preference lists would affect the likelihood of a super-stable
matching existing, with respect to randomly-generated SPA-ST instances. Our
main finding is that the probability of a super-stable matching existing is signif-
icantly higher if ties are restricted to the lecturers’ preference lists. Finally, Sect.
5 presents some concluding remarks and potential direction for future work.
2 Preliminary definitions
2.1 Formal definition of SPA-S
An instance I of SPA-S involves a set S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn1} of students, a set
P = {p1, p2, . . . , pn2} of projects and a set L = {l1, l2, . . . , ln3} of lecturers. Each
student si ranks a subset of P in strict order. We denote by Ai the ranked set of
projects that si finds acceptable. We say that si finds pj acceptable if pj ∈ Ai.
Each lecturer lk ∈ L offers a non-empty set of projects Pk, where P1, P2, . . . ,
Pn3 partitions P, and lk provides a preference list, denoted by Lk, ranking in
strict order of preference those students who find at least one project in Pk
acceptable. Also lk has a capacity dk ∈ Z+, indicating the maximum number of
students she is willing to supervise. Similarly each project pj ∈ P has a capacity
cj ∈ Z+ indicating the maximum number of students that it can accommodate.
We assume that for any lecturer lk, max{cj : pj ∈ Pk} ≤ dk ≤
∑{cj : pj ∈
Pk} (i.e., the capacity of lk is (i) at least the highest capacity of the projects
offered by lk, and (ii) at most the sum of the capacities of all the projects lk
is offering). We denote by Ljk, the projected preference list of lecturer lk for pj ,
which can be obtained from Lk by removing those students that do not find pj
acceptable (thereby retaining the order of the remaining students from Lk).
An assignment M is a subset of S × P such that (si, pj) ∈ M implies that
si finds pj acceptable. If (si, pj) ∈M , we say that si is assigned to pj , and pj is
assigned si. For convenience, if si is assigned in M to pj , where pj is offered by
lk, we may also say that si is assigned to lk, and lk is assigned si.
For any student si ∈ S, we let M(si) denote the set of projects assigned to si
in M . For any project pj ∈ P, we denote by M(pj) the set of students assigned
to pj in M . Project pj is undersubscribed, full or oversubscribed according as
|M(pj)| is less than, equal to, or greater than cj , respectively. Similarly, for any
lecturer lk ∈ L, we denote by M(lk) the set of students assigned to lk in M .
Lecturer lk is undersubscribed, full or oversubscribed according as |M(lk)| is less
than, equal to, or greater than dk, respectively.
A matching M is an assignment such that each student is assigned to at most
one project in M , each project is assigned at most cj students in M , and each
lecturer is assigned at most dk students in M . If si is assigned to some project
in M , for convenience we let M(si) denote that project.
In what follows, lk is the lecturer who offers project pj .
5Definition 1 (stability). Let I′ be an instance of spa-s, and let M be a match-
ing in I′. We say M is stable if it admits no blocking pair, where a blocking pair
is an acceptable pair (si, pj) ∈ (S ×P) \M such that (a) si is either unassigned
in M or prefers pj to M(si), and (b) either
(i) pj is undersubscribed and lk is undersubscribed, or
(ii) pj is undersubscribed, lk is full and either si ∈M(lk), or lk prefers si to the
worst student in M(lk), or
(iii) pj is full and lk prefers si to the worst student in M(pj).
For a full description of an algorithm to find a stable matching in this setting,
we refer the interested reader to [1,16].
2.2 Ties in the preference lists
We now define formally the generalisation of SPA-S in which preference lists can
include ties. In the preference list of lecturer lk ∈ L, a set T of r students forms a
tie of length r if, for any si, si′ ∈ T , lk does not prefer si to si′ (i.e., lk is indifferent
between si and si′). A tie in a student’s preference list is defined similarly. For
convenience, in what follows we consider a non-tied entry in a preference list as
a tie of length one. We denote by SPA-ST the generalisation of SPA-S in which the
preference list of each student (respectively lecturer) comprises a strict ranking
of ties, each comprising one or more projects (respectively students).
An example SPA-ST instance I1 is given in Fig. 1, which involves the set of
students S = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5}, the set of projects P = {p1, p2, p3} and the
set of lecturers L = {l1, l2}. Ties in the preference lists are indicated by round
brackets.
Student preferences Lecturer preferences
s1: p1 l1: s5 (s1 s2) s3 s4 l1 offers p1, p2
s2: (p1 p3) l2: s4 s5 s2 l2 offers p3
s3: p2
s4: p2 p3 Project capacities: c1 = c3 = 1, c2 = 2
s5: p3 p1 Lecturer capacities: d1 = 2, d2 = 1
Fig. 1. An example instance I1 of SPA-ST.
In the context of SPA-ST, we assume that all notation and terminology carries
over from Sect. 2.1 as defined for SPA-S with the exception of stability, which
we now define. When ties appear in the preference lists, three levels of stability
arise (as in the HRT context [10,11]), namely weak stability, strong stability and
super-stability. The formal definition for weak stability in SPA-ST follows from
the definition for stability in SPA-S (see Definition 1). Moreover, the existence of
a weakly stable matching in an instance I of SPA-ST is guaranteed by breaking
the ties in I arbitrarily, thus giving rise to an instance I′ of spa-s. Clearly, a
stable matching in I′ is weakly stable in I. Indeed a converse of sorts holds,
which gives rise to the following proposition (see [20] for proof).
6Proposition 2. Let I be an instance of SPA-ST, and let M be a matching in I.
Then M is weakly stable in I if and only if M is stable in some instance I′ of
SPA-S obtained from I by breaking the ties in some way.
As mentioned earlier, super-stability is the most robust concept to seek in a prac-
tical setting. Only if no super-stable matching exists in the underlying problem
instance should other forms of stability be sought.
Definition 2 (super-stability). Let I be an instance of spa-st, and let M be
a matching in I. We say M is super-stable if it admits no blocking pair, where a
blocking pair is an acceptable pair (si, pj) ∈ (S ×P) \M such that (a) either si
is unassigned in M or si prefers pj to M(si) or is indifferent between them; and
(b) either
(i) pj is undersubscribed and lk is undersubscribed, or
(ii) pj is undersubscribed, lk is full, and either si ∈M(lk) or lk prefers si to the
worst student in M(lk) or is indifferent between them, or
(iii) pj is full and lk prefers si to the worst student in M(pj) or is indifferent
between them.
It may be verified that the matching M = {(s3, p2), (s4, p3), (s5, p1)} is super-
stable in the SPA-ST instance shown in Fig. 1. Clearly, a super-stable matching
is weakly stable.
3 An algorithm for SPA-ST under super-stability
In this section we present our algorithm for SPA-ST under super-stability, which
we will refer to as Algorithm SPA-ST-super. First, we note that our algorithm
is a non-trivial extension of Algorithm SPA-student for spa-s from [1] and Al-
gorithm HRT-Super-Res for hrt from [10]. Due to the more general setting of
SPA-ST, Algorithm SPA-ST-super requires some new ideas, and the proofs of the
correctness results are more complex than for the aforementioned algorithms
for spa-s and hrt. In Sect. 3.1, we give a description of our algorithm, before
presenting it in pseudocode form. We present the algorithm’s correctness results
in Sect. 3.2.
3.1 Description of the algorithm
First, we present some definitions relating to the algorithm. In what follows, I is
an instance of SPA-ST, (si, pj) is an acceptable pair in I and lk is the lecturer who
offers pj . Further, if (si, pj) belongs to some super-stable matching in I, we call
(si, pj) a super-stable pair and si a super-stable partner of pj (and vice-versa).
During the execution of the algorithm, students become provisionally as-
signed to projects. It is possible for a project to be provisionally assigned a num-
ber of students that exceed its capacity. This holds analogously for a lecturer.
The algorithm proceeds by deleting from the preference lists certain (si, pj) pairs
that cannot be super-stable. By the term delete (si, pj), we mean the removal of
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ence list of lecturer lk for pj). In addition, if si is provisionally assigned to pj at
this point, we break the assignment. By the head of a student’s preference list
at a given point, we mean the set of one or more projects, tied in her preference
list after any deletions might have occurred, that she prefers to all other projects
in her list.
For project pj , we define the tail of Ljk as the least-preferred tie in Ljk after any
deletions might have occurred (recalling that a tie can be of length one). In the
same fashion, we define the tail of Lk (preference list of lecturer lk) as the least-
preferred tie in Lk after any deletions might have occurred. If si is provisionally
assigned to pj , we define the successors of si in Ljk as those students that are
worse than si in Ljk. An analogous definition holds for the successors of si in Lk.
We now describe our algorithm. Algorithm SPA-ST-super begins by initialis-
ing an empty set M which will contain the provisional assignments of students
to projects (and intuitively to lecturers). We remark that such assignments can
subsequently be broken during the algorithm’s execution. Also, each project is
initially assigned to be empty (i.e., not assigned to any student).
The while loop of the algorithm involves each student si who is not provi-
sionally assigned to any project in M and who has a non-empty list applying in
turn to each project pj at the head of her list. Immediately, si becomes provi-
sionally assigned to pj in M (and to lk). If, by gaining a new student, pj becomes
oversubscribed, it turns out that none of the students st at the tail of Ljk can
be assigned to pj in any super-stable matching – such pairs (st, pj) are deleted.
Similarly, if by gaining a new student, lk becomes oversubscribed, none of the
students st at the tail of Lk can be assigned to any project offered by lk in any
super-stable matching – such pairs (st, pu), for each project pu ∈ Pk that st finds
acceptable, are deleted.
Regardless of whether any deletions occurred as a result of the two con-
ditionals described in the previous paragraph, we have two further (possibly
non-disjoint) cases in which deletions may occur. If pj becomes full, we let sr be
any worst student provisionally assigned to pj (according to Ljk), and we delete
(st, pj) for each successor st of sr in Ljk. Similarly if lk becomes full, we let sr be
any worst student provisionally assigned to lk, and we delete (st, pu), for each
successor st of sr in Lk and for each project pu ∈ Pk that st finds acceptable. As
we will prove later, none of the (student, project) pairs deleted when a project
or a lecturer becomes full can be a super-stable pair.
At the point where the while loop terminates (i.e., when every student is
provisionally assigned to one or more projects or has an empty list), if some
project pj that was previously full ends up undersubscribed, we let sr be any one
of the most preferred students (according to Ljk) who was provisionally assigned
to pj during some iteration of the algorithm but is not assigned to pj at this point
(for convenience, we henceforth refer to such sr as the most preferred student
rejected from pj according to Ljk). If the students at the tail of Lk (recalling
that the tail of Lk is the least-preferred tie in Lk after any deletions might have
occurred) are no better than sr, it turns out that none of these students st can
8be assigned to any project offered by lk in any super-stable matching – such
pairs (st, pu), for each project pu ∈ Pk that st finds acceptable, are deleted. The
while loop is then potentially reactivated, and the entire process continues until
every student is provisionally assigned to a project or has an empty list.
At the termination of the repeat-until loop, if the set M , containing the
provisional assignments of students to projects, is super-stable relative to the
given instance I then M is output as a super-stable matching in I. Otherwise,
the algorithm reports that no super-stable matching exists in I. We present
Algorithm SPA-ST-super in pseudocode form in Algorithm 1.
3.2 Correctness of Algorithm SPA-ST-super
We now present the following results regarding the correctness of Algorithm
SPA-ST-super. For several lemmas in this section, we either omit the proof or
provide a sketch proof; see [20] for the full proofs. The first of these results deals
with the fact that no super-stable pair is ever deleted during the execution of the
algorithm. In what follows, I is an instance of SPA-ST, (si, pj) is an acceptable
pair in I and lk is the lecturer who offers pj .
Lemma 1. If a pair (si, pj) is deleted during the execution of Algorithm
SPA-ST-super, then (si, pj) does not belong to any super-stable matching in I.
Proof (Sketch). Suppose (si, pj) is the first super-stable pair to be deleted during
some execution of the algorithm, which belongs to some super-stable matching,
say M∗. Let lk be the lecturer who offers pj . We consider five points in the
algorithm at which (si, pj) could be deleted. If (si, pj) is deleted because si
is in the tail of Ljk when pj became oversubscribed, we show that one of the
students provisionally assigned to pj at this point must form a blocking pair
for M∗ with pj , a contradiction. Similarly, if (si, pj) is deleted because si is
in the tail of Lk when lk became oversubscribed, we show that there is some
project pj′ ∈ Pk and some student sr, with sr provisionally assigned to pj′
in M∗ at this point, such that (sr, pj′) must form a blocking pair for M∗, a
contradiction. Further, if (si, pj) is deleted because si is a successor of a worst
student provisionally assigned to pj when pj became full, we show that one of
the students provisionally assigned to pj at this point must form a blocking
pair for M∗ with pj , a contradiction. Similarly, if (si, pj) is deleted because si
is a successor of a worst student provisionally assigned to lk when lk became
full, we show that there is some project pj′ ∈ Pk and some student sr, with sr
provisionally assigned to pj′ in M∗ at this point, such that (sr, pj′) must form a
blocking pair for M∗, a contradiction. Finally, suppose (si, pj) is deleted at line
33 of the algorithm, suppose pj′ is a project offered by lk which was previously
full but ended up undersubcribed in line 27 of the algorithm, and suppose sr is
the most preferred student rejected from pj′ according to Lj
′
k . We show that, in
order to avoid the pair (si′ , pj′) from blocking M∗, we can construct an infinite
sequence of distinct students, a contradiction to the finite size of the instance.
uunionsq
9Algorithm 1 Algorithm SPA-ST-super
Input: SPA-ST instance I
Output: a super-stable matching M in I or “no super-stable matching exists in I”
1: M ← ∅
2: for each pj ∈ P do
3: full(pj) = false
4: repeat
5: while some student si is unassigned and has a non-empty list do
6: for each project pj at the head of si’s list do
7: lk ← lecturer who offers pj
8: /* si applies to pj */
9: M ←M ∪ {(si, pj)} / *provisionally assign si to pj (and to lk) */
10: if pj is oversubscribed then
11: for each student st at the tail of Ljk do
12: delete (st, pj)
13: else if lk is oversubscribed then
14: for each student st at the tail of Lk do
15: for each project pu ∈ Pk ∩At do
16: delete (st, pu)
17: if pj is full then
18: full(pj) = true
19: sr ← worst student assigned to pj according to Ljk {any if > 1}
20: for each successor st of sr on Ljk do
21: delete (st, pj)
22: if lk is full then
23: sr ← worst student assigned to lk according to Lk {any if > 1}
24: for each successor st of sr on Lk do
25: for each project pu ∈ Pk ∩At do
26: delete (st, pu)
27: if some project pj is undersubscribed and full(pj) is true then
28: lk ← lecturer who offers pj
29: sr ← most preferred student rejected from pj according to Ljk {any if > 1}
30: if the students at the tail of Lk are no better than sr then
31: for each student st at the tail of Lk do
32: for each project pu ∈ Pk ∩At do
33: delete (st, pu)
34: until every unassigned student has an empty list
35: if M is a super-stable matching in I then
36: return M
37: else
38: return “no super-stable matching exists in I”
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The next three lemmas deal with the case that Algorithm SPA-ST-super reports
the non-existence of a super-stable matching in I.
Lemma 2. If any student is multiply assigned at the termination of Algorithm
SPA-ST-super, then I admits no super-stable matching.
Lemma 3. If some lecturer lk becomes full during some execution of Algorithm
SPA-ST-super and lk subsequently ends up undersubscribed at the termination of
the algorithm, then I admits no super-stable matching.
Lemma 4. If the pair (si, pj) was deleted during some execution of Algorithm
SPA-ST-super, and at the termination of the algorithm si is not assigned to a
project better than pj, and each of pj and lk is undersubscribed, then I admits
no super-stable matching.
The next lemma shows that the final assignment may be used to determine the
existence, or otherwise, of a super-stable matching in I.
Lemma 5. If at the termination of Algorithm SPA-ST-super, the assignment M
is not super-stable in I, then no super-stable matching exists in I.
Proof. Suppose M is not super-stable in I. If some student si is multiply assigned
in M , then I admits no super-stable matching, by Lemma 2. Hence suppose no
student is multiply assigned in M . Then M is a matching, since no project or
lecturer is oversubscribed in M . Let (si, pj) be a blocking pair of M in I, then si
is either unassigned in M or prefers pj to M(si) or is indifferent between them.
Whichever of these is the case, (si, pj) has been deleted and therefore does not
belong to any super-stable matching, by Lemma 1. Let lk be the lecturer who
offers pj . If (si, pj) was deleted as a result of lk being full or oversubscribed,
(si, pj) could only block M if lk ends up undersubscribed in M . If this is the
case, then I admits no super-stable matching, by Lemma 3.
Now suppose (si, pj) was deleted as a result of pj being full or oversubscribed.
Suppose firstly that pj ends up full in M . Then (si, pj) cannot block M irre-
spective of whether lk is undersubscribed or full in M , since lk prefers the worst
assigned student(s) in M(pj) to si. Hence suppose pj ended up undersubscribed
in M . As pj was previously full, each pair (st, pu), for each st that is no better
than si at the tail of Lk and each pu ∈ Pk ∩ At, would have been deleted in
line 33 of the algorithm. Thus if lk is full in M , then (si, pj) does not block
M . Suppose lk is undersubscribed in M . If lk was full at some point during the
execution of the algorithm, then I admits no super-stable matching, by Lemma
3. Suppose lk was never full during the algorithm’s execution. As (si, pj) is a
blocking pair of M , si cannot be assigned in M a project that she prefers to pj .
Hence I admits no super-stable matching, by Lemma 4.
Finally suppose (si, pj) was deleted (at line 33) because some other project
pj′ offered by lk was previously full and ended up undersubscribed at line 27.
Then lk must have identified her most preferred student, say sr, rejected from
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pj′ such that si is at the tail of Lk and si is no better than sr in Lk. Moreover,
every project offered by lk that si finds acceptable would have been deleted from
si’s preference list at the for loop iteration in line 33. If pj ends up full in M ,
then (si, pj) does not block M . Suppose pj ends up undersubscribed in M . If
lk is full in M , then (si, pj) does not block M , since si /∈ M(lk) and lk prefers
the worst student in M(lk) to si. Suppose lk is undersubscribed in M , again by
Lemma 4, I admits no super-stable matching. uunionsq
The next lemma shows that Algorithm SPA-ST-super may be implemented to
run in linear time.
Lemma 6. Algorithm SPA-ST-super may be implemented to run in O(L) time
and O(n1n2) space, where n1, n2, and L are the number of students, number of
projects, and the total length of the preference lists, respectively, in I.
Lemma 1 shows that there is an optimality property for each assigned student in
any super-stable matching found by the algorithm, whilst Lemma 5 establishes
the correctness of Algorithm SPA-ST-super. The following theorem collects to-
gether Lemmas 1, 5 and 6.
Theorem 1. For a given instance I of SPA-ST, Algorithm SPA-ST-super deter-
mines, in O(L) time and O(n1n2) space, whether or not a super-stable matching
exists in I. If such a matching does exist, all possible executions of the algo-
rithm find one in which each assigned student is assigned to the best project that
she could obtain in any super-stable matching, and each unassigned student is
unassigned in all super-stable matchings.
3.3 Properties of super-stable matchings in SPA-ST
The following theorem, which we will refer to as the Unpopular Projects Theorem,
gives some properties of super-stable matchings in an instance of SPA-ST that are
analogous to those satisfied by stable matchings in SPA-S [1, Theorem 4.1].
Theorem 2. For a given instance I of SPA-ST, the following holds.
1. Each lecturer is assigned the same number of students in all super-stable
matchings.
2. Exactly the same students are unassigned in all super-stable matchings.
3. A project offered by an undersubscribed lecturer has the same number of
students in all super-stable matchings.
4 Empirical Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate an implementation of Algorithm SPA-ST-super. We
implemented our algorithm in Python1, and performed our experiments on a
system with dual Intel Xeon CPU E5-2640 processors with 64GB of RAM, run-
ning Ubuntu 14.04. For our experiment, we were primarily concerned with the
following question: how does the nature of the preference lists in a given SPA-ST
instance affect the existence of a super-stable matching?
1 https://github.com/sofiatolaosebikan/spa-st-super-stability
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4.1 Datasets
For datasets, there are clearly several parameters that can be varied, such as the
number of students, projects and lecturers; the lengths of the students’ preference
list as well as a measure of the density of ties present in the preference lists. We
denote by td, the measure of the density of ties present in the preference lists. In
each student’s preference list, the tie density tds (0 ≤ tds ≤ 1) is the probability
that some project is tied to its successor. The tie density tdl in each lecturer’s
preference list is defined similarly. At tds = tdl = 1, each preference lists would
be contained in a single tie while at tds = tdl = 0, no tie would exist in the
preference lists, thus reducing the problem to an instance of SPA.
4.2 Experimental Setup
For each range of values for the aforementioned parameters, we randomly-generated
a set of SPA-ST instances, involving n1 students (which we will henceforth refer to
as the size of the instance), 0.5n1 projects, 0.2n1 lecturers and 1.5n1 total project
capacity which was randomly distributed amongst the projects. The capacity for
each lecturer lk was chosen randomly to lie between the highest capacity of the
projects offered by lk and the sum of the capacities of the projects that lk offers.
In each set, we measured the proportion of instances that admit a super-stable
matching. It is worth mentioning that when we varied the tie density on both
the students’ and lecturers’ preference lists between 0.1 and 0.5, super-stable
matchings were very elusive, even with an instance size of 100 students. Thus,
for the purpose of our experiment, we decided to choose a low tie density.
Experiment 1 In the first experiment, we increased the number of students n1
while maintaining a constant ratio of projects, lecturers, project capacities and
lecturer capacities as described above. For various values of n1 (100 ≤ n1 ≤ 1000)
in increments of 100, we created 1000 randomly-generated instances. The length
of each student’s preference list was fixed at 50. For all the preference lists,
we set tds = tdl = 0.005 (on average, 1 out of 5 students has a single tie of
length 2 in their preference list, and this holds similarly for the lecturers). The
result displayed in Fig. 2 shows that the proportion of instances that admit a
super-stable matching decreases as the number of students increases.
Experiment 2 In our second experiment, we varied the length of each student’s
preference list while maintaining the number of students, projects, lecturers,
project capacities and lecturer capacities, and tie density in the students’ and
lecturers’ preference lists, as in Experiment 1. For various values of n1 (100 ≤
n1 ≤ 1000) in increments of 100, we created 1000 randomly-generated instances.
In the first part of this experiment, the length of each student’s preference list
was set to 10, and in the second part, the length of each student’s preference list
was chosen randomly to lie between 0.25n1 and 0.5n1. The result is displayed in
Fig. 3. Although this result shows that more instances admitted a super-stable
matching when the preference list was longer compared to when the preference
list was fixed at 10, but this difference is not very significant.
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Experiment 3 In our last experiment, we investigated how the variation in
tie density in both the students’ and lecturers’ preference lists affects the exis-
tence of a super-stable matching. To achieve this, we varied the tie density in
the students’ preference lists tds (0 ≤ td ≤ 0.05) and the tie density in the lec-
turers’ preference lists tdl (0 ≤ td ≤ 0.05), both in increments of 0.005. For each
pair of tie densities in tds × tdl we randomly-generated 1000 SPA-ST instances for
various values of n1 (100 ≤ n1 ≤ 1000) in increments of 100. For each of these
instances, we maintained the same ratio of projects, lecturers, project capacities
and lecturer capacities as in Experiment 1. We also fixed the length of each stu-
dent’s preference list at 50. The result displayed in Fig. 4 shows that increasing
the tie density in both the students’ and lecturers’ preference lists reduces the
proportion of instances that admit a super-stable matching. In fact, this pro-
portion reduces further as the size of the instance increases. However, it was
interesting to see that when we fixed the tie density in the students’ preference
lists at 0 and varied the tie density in the lecturers’ preference lists, about 75%
of the randomly-generated SPA-ST instances involving 1000 students admitted a
super-stable matching.
Fig. 2. Result for Experiment 1. Fig. 3. Result for Experiment 2.
Fig. 4. Each of the coloured square boxes represent the proportion of the 1000 randomly-generated
SPA-ST instances that admits a super-stable matching, with respect to the tie density in the stu-
dents’ and lecturers’ preference lists. See the colour bar transition, as this proportion ranges from
dark (100%) to light (0%).
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5 Discussions and Concluding Remarks
Based on the instances we generated randomly, the experimental results suggest
that as we increase the size of the instance and the density of ties in the preference
lists, the likelihood of a super-stable matching existing decreases. There was
no significant uplift in this likelihood even as we increased the lengths of the
students’ preference lists. Moreover, when the ties occur only in the lecturers’
preference lists, we found that a significantly higher proportion of instances
admit a super-stable matching. Given that there are typically more students than
lecturers in practical applications, it could be that only lecturers are permitted
to have some form of indifference over the students that they find acceptable,
whilst each student might be able to provide a strict ordering over what may be
a small number of projects that she finds acceptable. On the other hand we did
not find the same uplift for the case where ties belong to the students’ preference
lists only.
Further evaluation of our algorithm could investigate how other parameters
(e.g., the popularity of some projects, or the position of the ties in the preference
lists) affect the existence of a super-stable matching. It would also be interesting
to examine the existence of super-stable matchings in real SPA-ST datasets. From
a theoretical perspective, an interesting question would be: what is the probabil-
ity of a super-stable matching existing, given an arbitrary SPA-ST instance? This
question has been explored for the Stable Roommates problem (a non-bipartite
generalisation of the Stable Marriage problem) [21].
To cope with the possible non-existence of a super-stable matching, a natural
strategy would be to seek a strongly stable matching if one exists, and if not,
settle for a weakly stable matching. As noted in Section 1, every instance of SPA-
ST admits a weakly stable matching. We leave open the problem of constructing
an algorithm for SPA-ST under the strong stability criterion.
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